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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff/ Appellant Michael S. Robinson ("Robinson") hereby submits 
his Reply Brief in response to the brief filed on behalf of Defendants and 
Respondents Stephen C. Clark ("Clark'1, Melissa Bean ("Bean") and the law 
firm of Jones Waldo Holbrook McDonough ("Jones Waldo") (collectively "the 
Lawyers"). Despite the arguments submitted by the Lawyers, this Court 
should reverse the lower court because: 
1. It erred in ruling that Robinson was required to submit counter-
affidavits to the Lawyers' summary judgment motion (a) when the Lawyers' 
own summary judgment submissions contained Robinson's sworn testimony 
that created issues of material fact on both causation and standard of care; (b) 
even more certainly when the court relied upon additional evidence 
presented by the Lawyers in connection with a second motion that contained 
further sworn statements by Robinson creating issues of material fact; and ( c) 
then ignoring Robinson's sworn statements and submissions in connection 
with the second motion which further revealed disputes of material facts on 
the Lawyers' breaches of duty and causation. 
2. The lower court erred in ruling as a matter of law that expert 
testimony was required to establish the standard of care when the evidence 
included a "smoking gun" -- Clark, the senior attorney assigned to Robinson's 
multi-million dollar divorce case, allowed his associate Bean ( with only one 
year of private practice experience) to represent Robinson at a settlement 
conference against a senior and very experienced opposing counsel (Dean 
Andreasen), and then Bean failed to follow Clark's express instructions to 
include specific provisions in the settlement agreement ( which had been 
drafted by opposing counsel) to protect Robinson from misrepresentations 
and most importantly, from being held to the agreement in the event 
Robinson could not refinance the Phoenix Plaza, an event upon which the 
division of millions of dollars of assets and sources of income hinged. 
3. The lower court erred by deciding causation as a matter of law when 
the record clearly shows that the Lawyers' failure to include protective 
provisions has cost Robinson millions of dollars and left him impecunious. At 
the very least, there is an issue of material fact as to whether (a) it was the 
Lawyers' negligence causing his loss, or (b) it was his failure to perform a 
completely meaningless act - submit a loan application even though Bean had 
specifically instructed Robinson that he did not need to do so until his wife 
Debra Robinson ("Ms. Robinson") provided necessary financial and lease 
information required for the application and even though the clear terms of 
the loan application showed that the Phoenix Plaza failed to meet the 
underwriting requirements of the lenders because of a high percentage of 
vacancies and/ or no leases. 
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4. To the extent that Robinson was required to submit expert 
testimony and to respond to the motion, the lower court abused its discretion 
by denying Robinson and his new counsel a short, reasonable and justifiable 
two-month extension of time. The record is clear that Robinson was not 
dilatory, but diligently sought new counsel ( over 20 attorneys in four states), 
the motion for extension was meritorious, and there would have been 
absolutely no prejudice to the Lawyers. 
I. 
A. 
ARGUMENT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER WHERE THE RECORD 
REVEALED CLEAR QUESTIONS OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO 
THE LAWYERS' NEGLIGENCE AND CAUSATION. 
Robinson was Not Required to Submit Affidavits in 
Opposition to the Summary Judgment When the Lawyers' 
Submissions Showed Disputed Issues of Material Fact and 
Other Submissions Relied Upon by the Lower Court 
Contained Sworn Statements Creating Issues of Material 
Facts. 
Rule 56( c) provides that summary judgment is appropriate only when 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56( e) provides that when a 
motion for summary judgment is supported by affidavits and other evidence 
that the "adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of the 
pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
3 
trial." That same rule goes on to state, however, "Summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file such a response." 
Thus, in 0/well v. Clark, 659 P.2d 585, 586 (Utah 1982) the Court held 
that counter-affidavits are not always required if the moving party's 
submissions reveal issues of material fact: 
[U]nder Rule 56, Utah R.Civ.P., it is not always required that a 
party proffer affidavits in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment in order to avoid judgment against him. The 
[defendants] argue that the summary judgment must be 
affirmed because the [plaintiffs] have not complied with Rule 
56( c) and ( e ), having failed to file such affidavits. The rule itself 
sets the criteria for the judgment: a party may receive the 
judgment requested if (a) the pleadings and affidavits, if any, 
show no issue as to any material fact, and (b) the party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56( e) states 
specifically that a response in opposition to a motion must be 
supported by affidavits or other documents only in order to 
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of fact for trial. Where 
the party opposed to the motion submits no documents in 
opposition, the moving party may be granted summary 
judgment only "if appropriate," that is, if he is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. [ citing Lockhart Co. v. Anderson, 646 
P.2d 678 (1982). 
Similarly, in Frisbee v. K&K Const Co., 676 P.2d 387, 390 (Utah 1984)1 
the defendant had failed to oppose a motion for summary judgment, but 
demonstrated that issues of material fact were present before the lower 
court. In reversing the summary judgment, the Court stated: 
Where the moving affidavit shows on its face that there is a 
material issue of fact, summary judgment may not be entered, 
1 These cases also demonstrate that this court will evaluate the propriety of 
summary judgment on appeal even where no opposition was filed. 
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even if responsive affidavits are not filed. In this case, [plaintiff] 
is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. His 
affidavit and supporting documents presented conclusions with 
no supporting facts and show unresolved issues of fact. 
See Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, 
Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984); Woodward v. Board of Directors 
of Tamaron Association of Condominium Owners, 155 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 2007); People v. Hernandez and Assocs, Inc., 736 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1986)("Although it may be perilous for the party opposing summary 
judgment not to file a responsive affidavit, ... election not to do so does not 
relieve the moving party of its burden to establish that summary judgment is 
appropriate .... Here, the People did not meet that burden."); Glassner v. 
Northwest Lustre Craft Co., 591 P.2d 419, 420-21 (Or. Ct. App.1979)(summary 
judgment reversed where exhibits submitted by moving party showed 
disputes of fact). 
Contrary to the Lawyers' contentions, Robinson did not merely rely 
upon the allegations or denials of the pleadings. He also did not ask the lower 
court to "ferret out" facts disclosing material disputes. His position is simple: 
if the district court is going to consider the evidence presented, then the 
district court must consider all the evidence submitted and view all such facts 
and inferences therefrom in a light most favorable to Robinson, rather than 
picking or choosing among the pieces of evidence or deciding that the 
Lawyers' evidence was entitled to greater weight that Robinson's. Even a 
5 
single sworn statement from Robinson (and there were many) is sufficient to 
defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 
888 P.2d 1097, 1100-01 (Utah 1995)(summary judgment reversed because "a 
trial court should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be 
whether material issues of fact exist."); Willey v. Bu9den, 2013 UT App 297, 
,r,r26-27, 318 P.3d 757 (sworn affidavit of plaintiff that he did not receive 
plea bargain created an issue of fact and lower court improperly weighed 
evidence presented by two attorneys, an assistant, and evidence that the plea 
bargain had been sent via Federal Express); Davis v. Sperry, 2012 UT App 278, 
,r22 , 288 P.3d 26; Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 
Ct. App.1988)(and numerous cases cited therein); USA Power, LLC v. 
Paciftcorp, 2010 UT App 31, ,r,rs, 7, 235 P.3d 749 (in a summary judgment 
proceeding, the understanding, intention, and consequences of facts may 
create disputes barring summary judgment because all facts and the 
reasonable inferences to be made therefrom should be construed in a light 
favorable to the non-moving party). 
The record below was replete with factual issues. That "record" did not 
simply include affidavits and documents in the Lawyers' initial motion for 
summary judgment (which themselves demonstrated issues of fact). The 
court also considered, on the merits, additional sworn testimony and 
6 
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evidence submitted by the Lawyers in response to Robinson's request for 
extension of time. This was revealed in the lower court's ruling when it said: 
Additionally, the affidavits, emails, and other evidence 
presented by defendants in support of their motion 
demonstrate that plaintiff cannot show that any alleged breach 
by the defendants caused any loss to him. Plaintiff entered into a 
stipulation to resolve his divorce after long negotiations 
between him and his ex-wife personally. He accepted and used 
the accounting figures given him by his ex-wife after 
consultation with his accountant. He clearly wanted to retain 
ownership of the Phoenix Plaza and accepted the stipulation 
arrived at on Friday, November 2, 2007, without taking even a 
weekend to think it over. After the weekend he had second 
thoughts and tried to get his attorney's to "stop" the agreement. 
By then it was too late; he had signed the agreement and was 
bound by it. The emails between plaintiff and defendants 
demonstrate that they tried to come up with theories through 
which he could be relieved of his responsibility to refinance 
but told him the chances were 50/50 at best. Defendants' 
emails to plaintiff continually reminded him of his obligation 
to refinance the Plaza within 15 days but also show that he 
continually put off that obligation hoping to get a better 
interest rate and hoping not to have to pay the application fee 
for refinancing. Based upon his failure to even attempt to 
comply with the stipulation, this Court and other courts have 
ruled against him in other cases. Plaintiff cannot show that any 
actions by defendants have caused the financial losses he is 
facing. As other courts have held, his failure to even attempt to 
comply with the stipulation have been the cause of his loss. 
This "story line" was one that the Lawyers laid out in their opposition 
to Robinson's motion for extension of time, not simply in their original 
submissions in support of their motion for summary judgment. The emails 
referenced in the summary judgment ruling were attached as Exhibit 7 (R. 
651-678) to the Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Extension of Time. 
7 
The court reviewed the Lawyers' summary judgment submissions, but 
those submissions included Robinson's sworn responses to requests for 
admissions which disclosed issues of material fact. When the court then also 
considered the Lawyer's extra-summary judgment material, it was obligated 
to review Robinson's evidence as well to determine whether actual disputes 
of material facts existed. Not only did it fail to do this, but the evidence 
actually cited by the lower court does not support its factual conclusions.2 
Robinson's sworn statements presented in the Lawyers' memoranda 
and Robinson's submissions on his motion for extension of time, tell a very 
different story from that proffered by the Lawyers and recited by the district 
court. Robinson asserts that after the signing of the stipulation, he specifically 
needed the year-to-date income and expense statement and lease information 
from Ms. Robinson before he could even make a loan application to refinance 
the Plaza. Ms. Robinson failed to provide it and that during the first week 
2 Attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 5 ( continuing from the numbering of 
Addendum Exhibits from Robinson's Opening Brief) is a compilation of the evidence 
submitted by the Lawyers in their motion for summary judgment which revealed 
patent disputes of material facts and which was previously cited in Robinson's 
initial brief. Attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 6 is a compilation of the 
additional evidence submitted by the Lawyers in connection with the motion for 
extension of time that bore on the merits of the summary judgment motion and was 
obviously considered by the lower court. Attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 7 is 
a compilation of the evidence submitted by Robinson in connection with the motion 
for extension of time which bore directly on the merits of the motion for summary 
judgment. And attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit 8 is a chronological 
compilation of the email communications presented to the court which show that 
the Lawyer's characterization of those emails and the court's interpretation thereof 
was clearly wrong. 
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after the stipulation, Bean specifically told Robinson that he did not need to 
make the loan application because Ms. Robinson was breaching the 
stipulation by not cooperating and providing the necessary information to do 
so. See R. 404,408,411,684,685, and 714-716. 
Bean has essentially admitted and/or corroborated the foregoing facts 
in her Affidavit (R. 688-92). She admitted that the stipulation required Ms. 
Robinson to provide necessary information to Robinson to make a loan 
application; that Ms. Robinson did not provide that information until 
February 2008; that after the information was received, it was learned that 
the Plaza did not qualify for refinancing; and that Ms. Robinson's failure to 
provide the financial and lease information constituted a "first breach" of the 
stipulation. See Addendum Ex. 4 at ,r,r4, 5, 6, 12, and 13. 
The lower court's conclusion that the Lawyers were continually telling 
Robinson to file an application by November 17, 2007 is patently false. The 
emails, placed in chronological order (App. Ex. 8), reveal that at no time 
between November 2 and November 17, 2007 (the putative loan application 
date) did Bean modify her prior verbal advice that Robinson need not file a 
loan application until Ms. Robinson provided the required financial and lease 
information. The emails further show that as of Nqvember 26, 2007 (11 days 
after the loan application was to have been made) Bean was asking Robinson 
if he had received the necessary information from Ms. Robinson to review the 
9 
mall status; that Robinson continually expressed his concern about being able 
to conclude a refinancing within 12 0 days, but that he was diligently working 
on it (to the extent that he could without the requisite information) and was 
watching interest rates closely, especially since it was becoming more 
apparent that the Plaza's stipulated value was too high (11/29 /07); Bean was 
suggesting that Robinson seek Ms. Robinson's consent to modify the 
agreement (11/29 /07); Bean questioned whether Ms. Robinson was working 
with Robinson to get a good deal on the mortgage (11/29 /07); Robinson was 
making progress on a loan (11/29/07); several important matters (e.g. 
security deposits, pre-paid rent, rents received by Ms. Robinson on the Deer 
Valley Condo) had not been adequately addressed at the mediation and 
whether the parties would go back to mediation (11/29-30/07); Bean was 
suggesting to opposing counsel that the time to complete the refinance should 
be extended; problems were arising at the Plaza with leaking roofs that 
needed to be repaired; Ms. Robinson had misrepresented the net income from 
the Plaza; Robinson was concerned about making a loan application that 
would be denied as it would cost him a 1-2% fee to lock in any rates [ over 
$70,000]; Bean was suggesting additional mediation (11/30/07); Andreasen 
advised that Ms. Robinson would deal directly with Robinson to get issues 
resolved (12/5/07); Bean was suggesting that the date for the refinancing to 
occur should be extended (12/5/07); other issues besides the actual 
10 
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refinancing were at the forefront of discussion (12/5/07); two key tenants' 
roofs were leaking and the repairs needed to be addressed and paid for 
(12/7 /07 and 12/9 /07); Bean was continuing to confirm that Ms. Robinson 
was required to cooperate in making a loan application (12/9/07); and Ms. 
Robinson still had not provided necessary information (12/10-11/07). 
The emails presented to the court resumed March 17, 2008, after Ms. 
Robinson finally provided the requested rent and financial information in 
February. It was then formally documented that the Plaza would not qualify 
for a loan because of the un-leased space. In response to that information, 
Bean emailed that she was going to conduct research on "impossibility" and 
"first to breach" (3 /17 /08). Contrary to the Lawyers' contentions, Robinson is 
not relying on this email to assert that Bean was counseling him on the "first 
to breach" doctrine. Bean had told him this within a week of the mediation 
and the signing of the stipulation. The 3 /17 /08 email only confirmed what 
Bean had earlier told Robinson. 
Thereafter, the only request from the Lawyers for Robinson to make a 
loan application was for litigation posturing. Knowing full well that the loan 
application would be denied, Clark simply wanted it to prove to the court that 
it was impossible to refinance the Plaza. See emails of 10/11/08 and 11/7 /08. 
The evidence presented by the Lawyers' and by Robinson summarized 
in App. Exs. 5-8 contradicts virtually every aspect of the Lawyers' theory of 
11 
the case. The lower court improperly granted summary judgment with those 
disputed facts present. 
B. Robinson was Not Required to Present Expert Testimony 
Regarding the Lawyers' Negligence. 
The lower court held that: "Without an expert witness, plaintiff cannot 
demonstrate that defendants' representation of him in his divorce action fell 
below the standard of care." No expert testimony is required in this case to 
establish the Lawyer Defendants' negligence - it is patently obvious as shown 
by the following facts: 
1. Refinancing of the Phoenix Plaza was clearly the most critical 
element of the Stipulation (Addendum Ex. 1), as the division of 
millions of dollars of properties, the payment of over $1. 7 million to 
Ms. Robinson, and other provisions were expressly conditioned 
upon or clearly tied to that refinancing. See e.g. ,r13 (the St. George 
condominium), ,r14 (the Deer Valley condominium), ,r16 (the 
Phoenix Plaza itself), ,r17 (the parking lot property), ,rzo (the 
timing of payment of a portion of the equity in an airplane), ,r38, 
( reporting of income from the St. George condo), ,r39 ( reporting of 
Deer Valley Condo and timeshare income), if 41 (reporting of Plaza 
income), ,r42 (entitlement to pre-payments of taxes), if54 (using 
best efforts to refinance and cooperate in providing necessary 
12 
documentation on a timely basis), and if 55 (maintaining status quo 
on payment of expenses until refinancing occurs). 
2. Clark clearly recognized the importance of a successful refinance 
and foresaw the difficulties that would arise if it could not be. He 
clearly and specifically instructed Bean to protect Robinson in the 
event the Plaza could not be refinanced. It was so important to Clark 
that he stated it twice in his email to November 1, 2007 email to 
Bean (App. Ex. 2): "There probably ought to be some protections in 
the event he is unable notwithstanding his "best efforts" to 
refinance Phoenix Plaza .... [D]o your best to protect him against bad 
things that could happen down the road, like an unforeseen inability 
to refinance." 
3. Contrary to Clark's instruction, the Stipulation contained no 
provisions addressing what would happen in the event the Phoenix 
Plaza could not be refinanced. Because it could not be refinanced, 
Robinson had no ability to comply with the terms of the Stipulation. 
Clark's email to Bean is the "smoking gun" in this case. At the very least, 
it creates an issue of fact as to what the standard of care is - even without 
expert testimony. The issue is not a complex one about whether Robinson 
should have entered a stipulation exchanging cash for property. It is really 
quite simple - was Bean negligent in failing to follow the directions from her 
13 
senior attorney who clearly saw the dangers of being unable to refinance the 
Plaza? Case law demonstrates that no special expertise is required to make 
that determination. 
The Lawyers are critical of Robinson's previously cited cases George v. 
Caton, 600 P.2d 822, 829 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) and Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 
348 (Utah 1980) because the fact situations were much more simple than 
those presented here. But the reasoning of those two cases that no expert 
testimony is necessary if the duty of care is within common knowledge of a 
jury finds application in many other cases that are instructive. As aptly stated 
in Fleming v. Nicholson, 724 A.2d 1026 (Vt. 1998): 
There are situations, however, where expert testimony is not 
needed. Where a professional's lack of care is so apparent that 
only common knowledge and experience are needed to 
comprehend it, expert testimony is not required to assist the 
trier of fact in finding the elements of negligence. See Largess v. 
Tatem, 130 Vt. 2 71, 279, 291 A.2d 398, 403 (1972) ( expert 
testimony required to assist trier of fact in answering scientific 
and technical questions, but not questions that can be answered 
with reference to common knowledge); South Burlington Sch. 
Dst v. Calcagni-Frazier-Zajchowski Architects, Inc., 138 Vt. 33, 46, 
410 A.2d 1359, 1365 (1980) (expert testimony not required 
where facts are such that a layperson would know that breach of 
duty of care was proximate cause of injury). 
This case does not need expert testimony to show the Lawyers' negligence. 
In Farrow v. Health Services Corp., 604 P.2d 474 (Utah 1979), the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendants were negligent in failing to provide him 
proper care when, after surgery, he became confused, disoriented, and 
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suffered from hallucinations and jumped from his sixth floor hospital window 
resulting in permanent paralysis. Id. at 475. The Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that normally expert witness testimony was required in a medical 
malpractice case "unless the matter is one of common knowledge." Id. at 477. 
It reversed summary judgment for the hospital and treating physician 
because, in part, the deposition testimony of a registered nurse showed a 
clear breach of duty without the need of expert testimony: 
the physician's order for medication to be administered "stat" 
means immediately, and that to administer medication at 10:00 
p.m. when a "stat" order is given at 8:00 p.m. is not compliance 
with the physician's order. The testimony of these and other 
witnesses would clearly give rise to an issue of material fact, 
which should have been resolved by a jury trial rather than the 
court attempting to decide the case in the context of a motion for 
summary judgment." Id. at 4 78. 
Just as the nurse's failure to follow the doctor's instructions in Farrow was 
evidence creating an issue of material fact as to negligence without expert 
testimony, so does Bean's failure to follow Clark's instructions. 
In Jackson v. Dabney, 645 P.2d 613 (Utah 1982), summary judgment 
was reversed because a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether 
the attorney's conduct breached the standard of care when an attorney failed 
to pay $400 to opposing counsel to stop a foreclosure sale, reduce the 
arrangement to writing, confirm it by letter, or take other steps to ensure that 
his client's home was not sold at foreclosure. Id. at 614. The record reflects no 
testimony by an expert witness, but the Court concluded: "reasonable minds 
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could differ on the question of whether the attorney's actions in this matter 
measured up to the standard of care required of attorneys in their 
professional duties." Id. at 615. 
In Kranz v. Tiger, 914 A.2d 854 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2007) the plaintiff sued his 
former attorneys and an expert medical witness for malpractice on the 
grounds that the attorneys failed to properly communicate with a medical 
expert who was then not available for trial, causing the client to accept a 
lesser settlement in the underlying personal injury case. The client offered no 
expert testimony, and the trial court entered a directed verdict in the 
defendant attorneys' favor. The Kranz court reversed stating: 
Ordinarily, expert testimony is required in a legal malpractice 
case. But when the attorney's "duty is so basic that it may be 
determined by the court as a matter of law," expert evidence is 
not required to establish the attorney's duty of care .... In other 
words, "[ e ]xpert testimony is not required in legal malpractice 
cases where the issues are not 'beyond the knowledge of the 
average person,' or are 'within the ordinary knowledge and 
experience of laymen .... Or ... "[t]he most appropriate application 
of the common knowledge doctrine involves situations where 
the carelessness of the defendant is readily apparent to anyone 
of average intelligence and ordinary experience." 
We also have observed that "expert testimony may not be 
necessary to establish proximate cause in every legal 
malpractice case, particularly where the causal relationship 
between the attorney's malpractice and the client's loss is so 
obvious that the trier of fact can resolve the issue as a matter of 
common knowledge." 914 A.2d at 861 (internal citations 
omitted). 
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In short, improper communication between attorneys and an expert witness 
was deemed to be a matter which a reasonable jury could consider without 
expert testimony. 
In Olfe v. Gordon, 286 N.W.2d 573 (Wis. 1980), the court held that the 
plaintiff client was not required to submit expert testimony to establish the 
attorney's negligence in failing to follow explicit instructions to insure that 
she maintained a first lien position on property she was selling, even though 
the documents that were drafted were valid documents (but only gave her a 
second lien position). While acknowledging that expert testimony generally 
was required in cases of legal malpractice, the Olfe court noted: 
That general rule should be subject to the exception that such 
expert testimony is not necessary in cases where the conduct 
complained of can be evaluated adequately by a jury in the 
absence of expert testimony." ... The court reasoned that in this 
case, no expert testimony was required because: "[Plaintiff] 
seeks to hold [attorney] liable for his failure to effectuate her 
intent, even though the documents he prepared were not legally 
invalid.... [P]roof of negligence in failing to follow specific 
instructions concerning the nature and purpose of the 
documents desired does not require expert testimony. This case 
is controlled by the law of agency, and the attorney-client 
relationship does not alter [attorney's] alleged relationship to 
[plaintiff] as an agent to his principal.. .. A jury is competent to 
understand and apply the standards of care to which agents are 
held .... We conclude that expert testimony was not required to 
establish the applicable standard of care and [attorney's] alleged 
departure from that standard in order to have a jury determine 
the merits of [plaintiffs] allegations that [attorney] was 
negligent in that he failed to properly draft documents 
consistent with [plaintiffs] instructions. 
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286 N.W.2d at 578 (internal citations omitted). See also Jarman v. Hale, 731 
P.2d 813, 816 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) ( countervailing expert testimony not 
necessary where the an attorney fails to follow his clients' instructions with 
reasonable promptness and care, analogizing that latter situation to one of 
principal and agency). 
Based upon the foregoing cases, Bean failed to follow her superior's 
express instructions on a matter that was obviously critical to the settlement 
agreement. Failure to follow a superior's instruction is negligence as in 
Farrow.3 Failure to follow a client's instructions ( or in this case, a client's 
agent) as in Olfe and Jarman is negligence. Failure to protect a client's interest 
as in Jackson is negligence. Failure to follow up on communications as in 
Kranz is negligence. In all those cases, no expert testimony was required. 
None was required here, and the lower court erred in so holding. 
The cases cited by the Lawyers do not teach otherwise. For example, 
the Lawyers' best case is Callister v. Snowbird Corp., 2014 UT App 243. The 
question there was whether the plaintiff was required to present expert 
testimony to show that Snowbird failed to properly warn plaintiff of the 
danger of being struck by the tram. That case would be relevant if this Court 
had held that expert testimony was still required even if, for example, the 
3 The record is conspicuously absent of any contention that Bean even tried 
to negotiate for the protective provisions that she was instructed to include 
by Clark. 
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safety manager for Snowbird had issued a memo to the maintenance crew 
instructing them to clear enough snow from under the tram or to expand the 
barrier ropes out far enough so that someone would not get hit by a tram or 
put up more signs warning of the low tram. It is doubtful that under those 
analogous circumstances that expert testimony would have been required. 
The question of the Lawyers' negligence is clear, and at a minimum 
whether the Lawyers breached their duty of care is a jury question. Summary 
judgment was improperly granted on that issue. 
C. The Lower Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on 
the Issue of Causation. 
The lower court held that Robinson's claims were barred because any 
damages he suffered resulted from his failure to file a loan application within 
15 days rather than from the Lawyers' failure to make the Stipulation 
contingent upon Robinson's ability to refinance the Phoenix Plaza. This 
holding also was erroneous because it is for the jury to resolve such factual 
questions. See Unigard Ins. Co. v. LaVerkin, 689 P.2d 1344 (Utah 1984) 
( whether proximate cause of injuries was city's failure to keep yield sign 
unobstructed or plaintiff's failure to yield when required to do so was a jury 
question). As stated in Harline v. Barker, 854 P.2d 595, 600 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993): 
Proximate cause is an issue of fact .... Thus, only if there is no 
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation, is 
summary judgment appropriate. 
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Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and 
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening 
cause, produces the injury and without which the result would 
not have occurred .... In a legal malpractice action this standard 
can be distilled to the following: The client must show that if the 
attorney had adhered to the ordinary standards of professional 
competence and had done the act he failed to do or not done the 
act complained about, the client would have benefited. 
The Harline court went on to hold that summary judgment was improper 
because despite the client's knowledge of his own fraudulent activity to 
transfer assets which caused his bankruptcy discharge to be denied, a jury 
question as to proximate cause was presented, i.e. whether a different result 
would have been achieved in bankruptcy court had the defendant attorney 
suggested that his client amend his bankruptcy schedules to reveal his 
"questionable dealings." Id. at 602. 
The Lawyers make the astonishing claim that their malpractice caused 
no damage to Robinson. It could not be more self-evident that had Bean 
included the protective provisions she was instructed to provide that the 
entire focus of the divorce action would have changed. The issue would not 
have been whether a loan application was made in 15 days, but whether it 
was even possible to get a loan. The evidence is clear and overwhelming that 
Robinson never could have refinanced the Plaza because of the vacancies and 
short-term leases. 
Further, the lower court could not decide as a matter of law that the 
failure to make an improper loan application within 15 days was the cause of 
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Robinson's losses when there were sworn statements by Robinson that prior 
to November 17, 2007, Bean had advised him that he did not need to make 
the loan application until Ms. Robinson first cooperated and provided the 
necessary financial report and lease information to make the loan. 
The record below contained Robinson's testimony of the damages he 
suffered as a result of not being able to avoid the Stipulation (and later 
Decree) because of his inability to refinance. Among other things, he lost all 
his significant assets and sources of income; he incurred very substantial 
attorneys fees in the many years that he has been trying to protect himself 
from Ms. Robinson's relentless collection efforts; and he has served nearly 30 
days in jail for a contempt charge because he lacked funds to pay Ms. 
Robinson's court-ordered attorneys fees. 
The Lawyers also contend that Robinson cannot prove that he suffered 
damages because he failed to present evidence to the court that he would 
have achieved a better result had the malpractice not occurred. But the proof 
that Michael would have been better off is apparent and is a reasonable 
conclusion as a matter oflaw. 
If Ms. Robinson had refused to enter into the Stipulation because she 
would be required to warrant the information she had provided Robinson, or 
if she would have refused to make it contingent upon a successful refinance, 
then there would have been no settlement (as she testified in her deposition), 
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the divorce would have proceeded to trial. Utah case law clearly provides that 
generally each party is entitled to that party's separate property and then the 
marital property is awarded roughly equally. See Thompson v. Thompson, 
2009 UT App 101, 208 P.3d 539; Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1022 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993). The Lawyer Defendants cannot dispute this standard. 
Even if all the properties had been divided evenly (without any regard 
to Robinson's significantly greater contributions of pre-marital assets which 
were 90% of all the assets), Robinson would still have several million dollars 
to his name. Now he has virtually nothing. 
That disastrous result would have been avoided if Bean had simply 
followed Clark's instructions to make the settlement contingent upon 
Robinson's ability to successfully refinance the Plaza ( and to require that Ms. 
Robinson's representations be accurate). To this day, no court has ever 
determined that Robinson actually had the ability to refinance the Plaza. 
Indeed, Bean herself testified in her affidavit that the Plaza could not have 
been refinanced. 
In passing, the Lawyers argue that the ruling of the divorce court 
collaterally estops Robinson from arguing that there were any other causes to 
his losses other than his failure to file a loan application within 15 days of the 
Stipulation. To the contrary, no court has yet determined the issue of whether 
the failure to make the Stipulation contingent upon a successful refinance was 
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a proximate cause of Robinson's injuries, whether the Lawyers were 
negligent; or whether the Plaza could be refinanced. There is no collateral 
estoppel. Thus, summary judgment was improperly granted on the issue of 
causation. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY NOT 
GRANTING ROBINSON ADDITIONAL TIME TO COMPLETE 
DISCOVERY, SECURE AN EXPERT WITNESS, AND RESPOND 
TO THE LAWYERS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The lower court denied Robinson's and his new counsel's motion for 
extension of time on the grounds that Robinson had failed to meet discovery 
and expert witness designation dates and that Robinson did not present a 
sufficient basis to excuse "his lack of diligence in completing discovery." 
Under the unique facts of this case, these conclusions are unfounded, and the 
lower court abused its discretion in denying Robinson's request. 
Because of the Lawyers' malpractice, Robinson has been rendered 
impecunious - now living primarily only on a modest pension and social 
security. He has been facing massive attorneys fees in defending the 
underlying divorce which is now finally on appeal to this Court and scheduled 
for hearing on March 23, 2015. Because of lack of funds, he has been required 
to diligently search for counsel willing to take this malpractice case on a 
contingency basis. That has not been an easy task. 
Robinson filed the initial Complaint, pro se, on October 31, 2011 in 
order to avoid any argument that he did not file within the applicable statute 
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of limitations. He continued to search for attorneys to represent him, serve 
the Complaint, and prosecute the case. The Lawyers moved to dismiss the 
Complaint for untimely service. On May 24, 2012, nearly seven months after 
the initial filing of the Complaint, the court denied the Lawyers' motion to 
dismiss. The Lawyers' Answer was not filed until July 23, 2012, nearly nine 
months after the filing of the initial Complaint. Only then could discovery 
commence. Thus, much of the delay in initiating discovery resulted from the 
Lawyers' own defensive actions. 
The parties then filed their Scheduling Plan and Order, which was 
entered on January 2, 2013. After Robinson had retained counsel, after the 
Lawyers had pursued dismissal and after the Scheduling Order was finally in 
place, the parties diligently pursued discovery. Initial disclosures were 
exchanged within one week of the Scheduling Order. The Lawyers then 
sought leave and ultimately filed an Amended Answer on February 12, 2012. 
Robinson had responded to written discovery and provided supplemental 
disclosures by February 20, 2012 and March 8, 2012. On March 22, 2012, a 
little over one month after the Lawyers filed their Amended Answer, 
Robinson issued his amended written discovery to the Lawyers on March 26, 
2012. Third-party discovery was issued to Northmarq Capital (one of 
Robinson's mortgage brokers). 
The only Scheduling Order set completion of fact discovery for 
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June 28, 2013 (only six months). Robinson was to designate any expert 
witnesses by July 26, 2013, and expert discovery was to be completed by 
October 30, 2013. All dispositive motions were to be filed by November 15, 
2013. No trial date was set. 
Then, on April 8, 2012, less than three months before the discovery 
cut-off date, Robinson's counsel withdrew. On that same date, the Lawyers 
filed their Notice to Appoint New Counsel or to Appear. The unexpected 
withdrawal of Robinson's counsel, could not have come at a worse time for 
Robinson. There was grossly inadequate time to secure new counsel, given 
the difficulty initially retaining counsel, much less finding one to take the case 
on contingency in its latter stages against lawyers from two of Utah's most 
prominent law firms. 
Robinson was unable to secure new counsel until August 12, 2013, only 
a few days before the response to the Lawyers' motion for summary 
judgment was due. In support of his new attorney's motion for extension of 
time, Robinson submitted affidavits to the court describing his herculean 
efforts to secure new counsel, which was given very short-shrift by the court. 
His affidavits showed that almost immediately on his counsels' withdrawal, 
Robinson began contacting approximately 20 attorneys including four out-of-
state firms in Wyoming, Texas, Arizona, and California. He was met with 
claims of conflict-of-interests or simple unwillingness to take the case for 
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professional and social reasons. Robinson also described how time-
consuming the process was because some of the lawyers took over a month to 
inform Robinson of their decision to not take the case. Robinson's new 
counsel, Mr. Kimball, took several weeks before taking the case which 
happened the Friday before the summary judgment response was due. See R. 
553 at ,r,r5-6. 
Robinson also explained that he was understandably incapable of 
representing himself in this action. Thus, he devoted his efforts almost 
exclusively to securing counsel in this multi-million dollar case. (R. 554, 555 
at ,r,r9, 10). With so much at stake, it was not unreasonable for him to do so 
given the dire circumstances he was under. If he had attempted to represent 
himself, even more errors were likely to be made making his ability to secure 
new counsel on a contingency basis even less likely. 
Mr. Kimball jumped into the fray with almost no chance to learn the 
facts of the case or to even have time to prepare a comprehensive 
memorandum in support of his motion for a mere two-month extension of 
time to conduct discovery, designate an expert ( which he actually did do only 
a couple of weeks later), and file a substantive memorandum opposing the 
summary judgment. 
These were truly extraordinary circumstances. The court's conclusion 
that "Plaintiff did not present a sufficient basis to excuse his lack of diligence 
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in completing discovery," (i.e. within the last three months of a six month 
discovery period) is completely refuted by the record. Robinson's motion was 
meritorious, and there was no lack of diligence either in Robinson's 
attempting to secure counsel or in conducting discovery once the issues were 
engaged and counsel retained. The modest extension would have caused no 
prejudice to the Lawyers, who had filed their summary judgment motion 
more than three and one-half months before the dispositive motion deadline 
and no trial date had yet been set. 
The appellate courts of this state have repeatedly held that motions for 
extension of time should be liberally granted unless they are deemed dilatory 
or lacking in merit. Energy Mgmt. Servs., L.L.C. v. Shaw, 2005 UT App 90, ,r10, 
110 P.3d 158; Salt Lake County v. Western Dairymen Coop., 2002 UT 39, ,r,r 27-
29, 48 P.3d 910 (trial court abused its discretion in denying Rule 56(f) 
motion). Robinson's motion was neither. 
None of the cases cited by the Lawyers to support the court's discretion 
to deny the motion for extension of time even come close to the extreme 
circumstances of this case. They are therefore inapposite. Instead, even 
though stated in the context of a Rule 37 argument, Boice by and through 
Boice v. Marble, 1999 UT 29, ,r10, 982 P.2d 565 teaches: "On occasion, justice 
and fairness will require that a court allow a party to designate witnesses, 
conduct discovery, or otherwise perform tasks covered by a scheduling order 
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after the court imposed deadline for doing so has expired." That should be the 
ruling of this Court here. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the summary judgment granted against 
Robinson, and the lower court ordered to grant Robinson reasonable time to 
secure new counsel, complete discovery, designate an expert witness and 
proceed to trial to recover the millions of dollars he has lost due to the 
Lawyers' negligence. 
·~ 
DATED this !f_ day of February, 2015. 
Michael S. Robinson, pro se 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 5 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 5 
Summary of Evidence Submitted to the Lower Court by the Lawyer 
Defendants Directly in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment 
and which Disclosed Issues of Material Fact 
The Lawyer Defendants filed their Memorandum in Support of Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 301-496). Attached as Exhibit 10 to that 
memorandum was [Robinson's J Answers to Defendants First Set of Requests for 
Interrogatories, dated March 8, 2013 (R. 403-13): 
Admission No. 3: Prior to and during the mediation Ms. Bean expressly 
told Plaintiff that she would protect Plaintiff and represent his 
interests. Plaintiff also understood that Mr. Clark would properly 
protect my interests by supervising Ms. Bean in all aspects of the 
divorce .... 
Admission No. 5: Within a week of the mediation, Ms. Bean advised 
Plaintiff that Plaintiff"was not required to perform" because Ms. 
Robinson refused to provide updated information in order to assist 
me in the application for refinance. Ms. Bean advised Plaintiff that 
Ms. Robinson was first to breach and that there "was essentially no 
agreement." (R. 404) .... 
In Answer to Interrogatory No. 5: But for the proper protections Mr. 
Clark instructed Ms. Bean to include in the settlement documents 
Plaintiffs pension would not have been targeted by Ms. Robinson. Ms. 
Robinson has been unrelenting in her attempts to have Plaintiff found 
in contempt for failing to pay the amounts set forth in the stipulation 
which Ms. Bean advised Plaintiff to sign. (R. 405) .... 
In Answer to Interrogatory No. 8:Plaintiff relied upon the advice of the 
Defendants as to the best ways to deal with any information provided 
by Ms. Robinson, including the "Handwritten Analysis" [wherein Ms. 
Robinson made representations as the net monthly income of the 
Plaza, which were then used to determine the Plaza's stipulated value]. 
(R. 408) .... 
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In Answer to Interrogatory No. 11: In addition to John Gottschall 
mentioned above [Ms. Robinson's mortgage broker who provided 
declarations in the divorce action stating that the Plaza did not meet 
loan requirements], Steve Clifford, mortgage broker at NorthMarq in 
Denver, advised [Robinson] regarding the conditions under which a 
lender would approve a loan which were that 90% of the rentable 
space in the Plaza had to be rented under acceptable, long-term leases. 
Steve Clifford made it clear that the 90% was mandatory. Plaintiff 
advised Ms. Bean of this information .... 
In addition, Mark McMullen, an underwriter at River Source 
[ mortgage company] reviewed the lease information and said that his 
company could "not have closed the loan" and said that in order to be 
counted as income for the purpose ofloan repayment back in 20078, 
leases had to have two years remaining. He also added that the 
requirements were even tougher as of the time of the conversation. 
Eric Wadley was vice president of Lehman Brothers commercial 
lending. When I could not find financing anywhere else, I thought that 
maybe he could help me, as he's married to my oldest daughter. He 
reviewed the situation and said that Lehman Brothers lending 
underwriting had gotten very strict back in August 2007, and that his 
company would not provide a loan for the Phoenix Plaza. (R. 409) .... 
In Answer to Interrogatory No. 13: Ms. Bean graduated from law school 
in 2003. From 2004 to 2006 she was a judicial clerk at the Supreme 
Court of Utah. When Plaintiff retained Defendants, it appears that Ms. 
Bean had less than one year of actual experience in private practice. 
Jones Waldo and Mr. Clark assigned Plaintiffs multi-million dollar 
divorce case to Ms. Bean who was then allowed to face a significantly 
more experienced opponent. Mr. Clark had limited involvement in the 
case prior to the time of the mediation. 
The night before the mediation Ms. Bean asked Mr. Clark if he 
would review the stipulation provided by opposing counsel. In a 
brief response, Mr. Clark told Ms. Bean "There probably ought to be 
some protection in the event he is unable., notwithstanding his 'best 
efforts' to refinance the Phoenix Plaza ... can't tell whether it's a 
good deal for him or not, but do your best to protect him against 
bad things that could happen down the road, like an unforeseen 
inability to refinance.,, In addition, in the same email exchange the 
night before the mediation., Mr. Clark stated that "I notice there is a 
disclosure provision, but it's not really apposite or thorough. We did 
one in Dr. Segal's divorce (also involving Dean) that may be 
better .... ,, Mr. Clark was not present at the mediation. To Plaintiff's 
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knowledge, Ms. Bean did not consult with or have Mr. Clark review 
the final draft of the agreement before it was signed. However, Ms. 
Bean advised Plaintiff to sign the agreement in spite of the fact that 
the agreement did not include language that would protect Plaintiff 
"in the event he was unable notwithstanding his 'best efforts' to 
refinance the Phoenix Plaza" or "protect him against bad things 
that could happen down the road like an unforeseen inability to 
refinance."(R. 410-11) .... 
In Answer to Interrogatory No. 14: After the mediation, Ms. Bean 
advised Plaintiff that Ms. Robinson's conduct was the "first to 
breach" and so essentially there was no agreement and therefore 
Plaintiff was not required to file the application. Ms. Bean advised 
that because of Ms. Robinson's "first breach" the agreement would be 
set aside and would be renegotiated. Ms. Bean repeated this to 
Plaintiff over the course of several months and the arguments made 
by Defendants in motions and hearings at subsequent proceedings 
were based upon the same premise. (R. 411) .... 
In Answer to Interrogatory No. 15: Plaintiff asked for current loan 
quotes for the multiple "pre-qualified" loans that Ms. Robinson's 
mortgage broker provided. Plaintiff contacted River Source Life 
Insurance Company, and it supplied a mortgage application. Plaintiff 
obtained as much information as he could to submit the application. 
However, Ms. Robinson did not produce the required YTD [year-to-
date] income and expense reports requested by Ms. Bean from Ms. 
Robinson and her counsel. Ms. Robinson's attorney, when asked by 
Ms. Bean for the information, advised in a letter or email that those 
types of reports were not customarily supplied until around March of 
the following year, just ahead of the tax season. Ms. Bean was not 
successful in getting that report until February 22, 2008. 
Plaintiff also contacted another broker, Steve Clifford with 
Northmarq in Denver, Colorado. Mr. Clifford said he had lender [sic] 
that was interested in the property. Columbian Mutual Life Insurance 
Company, and supplied Plaintiff with an application. Plaintiff was able 
to provide him with all the requested documents in December 2007, 
with the exception of the required YTD income and expense report that 
Ms. Robinson and her counsel had refused to provide. Plaintiff sent 
Mr. Clifford all the other documents and filled out the application, 
but that application, just like the one from River Source, also 
required that at least 90% of the Phoenix Plaza be under long term, 
valid, not in default, leases acceptable to the lender. The Phoenix 
3 
Plaza at the time of the mediation was only 72% under valid long 
term leases, and by December when Plaintiff filled out the 
application for Columbian Mutual Plaintiff had still not received the 
necessary information from Ms. Robinson or her counsel to 
complete an application. (R. 411-12). 
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Lawyer Defendants in Their Opposition to Robinson's Motion for 
Extension of Time and which Disclosed Issues of Material Fact 
The Lawyer Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Leave to File Sur-Reply (R. 580-696) contained the following evidence: 
1. The Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, which tied the 
division of nearly all ( and certainly the most valuable properties and 
sources of income) to the refinancing of the Phoenix Plaza . (R. 603-
616).1 
2. The Divorce Decree (R. 636-649), which incorporated wholesale the 
terms of the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement. 
3. A series of email communications (R. 651-681). These emails have 
been set out in chronological order and are attached as Appendix 
Exhibit 8. 
4. Plaintiff's Answers to Defendant's First Set of Requests for Admissions 
(R. 683-692), which made the following statements and had the 
following evidence attached: 
1 Page 3 of the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement is missing from this 
part of the record. However, its terms are fully set forth in the Divorce Decree (R. 
636-649) 
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ADMISSION NO. 3. Admit that, at the end of the mediation on 
November 2, 2007, Defendant Melissa Bean informed you that you 
could verify the information received from Debra Robinson during the 
mediation and did not have to sign any stipulation that day. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff admits that at the end of the mediation he was 
aware that he could verify the information disclosed by Ms. Robinson 
and her attorneys at the mediation prior to signing the document. 
However, Ms. Bean also advised Plaintiff that she was his attorney and 
assured him that the agreement protected Plaintiffs interests 
In an effort to respond to Interrogatory No. 1, which requests and 
explanation of "each Request for Admission" that Plaintiff did not 
unconditionally admit, please accept the following: Ms. Bean assured 
Plaintiff that the document he was to sign did in fact protect his 
interests. Even after it was discovered that Ms. Robinson's 
information was incorrect, Ms. Bean assured Plaintiff that his 
interests were protected because the terms of the document were 
impossible to meet and could be cured by additional mediation. 
ADMISSION NO. 5. Admit that, after the mediation on November 2, 
2007, Defendant Stephen Clark and Melissa Bean advised you to file an 
application to refinance the Phoenix Plaza Property. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to the phrase "after the mediation on 
November 2, 2007'' as being vague as to the timeframe involved. 
Without waiving said objection, Plaintiff admits that he and his 
attorneys/the Defendants discussed the need to file an application to 
refinance the Phoenix Plaza Property. However, Plaintiff denies that 
Defendants "advised" him to file the application within the 
timeframes outlined in the settlement agreement. 
In an effort to respond to Interrogatory No. 1, which requests an 
explanation of "each Request for Admission" that Plaintiff did not 
unconditionally admit, please accept the following: Plaintiff and his 
attorneys discussed the fat that before an actual application was 
filed, which application would have cost over $42,000, they would 
have to show an occupancy rate o/90% with valid leases that were 
acceptable to the Lender. As indicated in Ms. Bean's June 13, 2011 
affidavit, which is attached here to as Exhibit 1, Ms. Bean made 
repeated requests from Ms. Robinson's counsel to provide Plaintiff 
with monthly accounting reports, including year-end 2007 reports. 
After the mediation, Ms. Robinson failed to provide this additional 
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information. Ms. Bean advised Plaintiff that Ms. Robinson's conduct 
was the ''first to breach" and therefor Plaintiff was not required to 
file the application. Ms. Bean did not receive this information until 
months after the mediation and long after Plaintiff needed the 
information to be able to timely pursue refinance of the Phoenix 
Plaza Property. Further, after the mediation Plaintiff and his 
attorneys learned that the occupancy rate was far below what had 
been represented and far below what was needed to refinance the 
property. Plaintiff and the Defendants also learned that the net 
income from the property was $75,000 less that was represented at 
the mediation. In spite of this, Plaintiff did obtain tow refinance 
applications, one from River Source Insurance Company and one 
from Columbian Mutual Insurance Company. Plaintiff provided the 
brokers with all available documentation. Plaintiff and the 
Defendants were advised that the refinance was not available 
because lease requirements were not met, and that the percentage 
of leased space in the Plaza was far below the minimum 
requirement. Ms. Bean advised that because of Ms. Robinson's ''first 
breach" the agreement would be set aside and would be 
renegotiated. Even though the refinance, by definition, was not 
available, and the time frame had passed, both Ms. Bean and Mr. 
Clark suggested that Plaintiff should attempt to submit an 
application. However, because of the foregoing, Plaintiff was unable 
to complete an application. This whole process would have been 
avoided if Ms. Bean had followed Mr. Clark's instruction to be sure 
to include language in the settlement agreement accounting for the 
possibility that Plaintiff could not refinance the Phoenix Plaza 
Property. 
ADMISSION NO. 6. Admit that, between the date of the mediation on 
November 2, 2007 and the date that Debra Robinson filed her Motion 
for Entry of Decree of Divorce on February 7, 2008, you did not file an 
application to refinance the Phoenix Plaza Property. 
RESPONSE: Plaintiff admits that he did not file an application to 
refinance the Phoenix Plaza Property between November 2, 2007 and 
February 7, 2008. However, please see Plaintiffs response to Request 
for Admission No. 5, which is incorporated herein by reference. 
In addition to the foregoing and in an effort to respond to 
Interrogatory No. 1, which requests and explanation of "each Request 
for Admission" that Plaintiff did not unconditionally admit, please 
accept the following: As Defendants know, the underwriting 
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requirements of the lenders showed that any completed application 
was futile because any loan would require 90% of the property to 
Git be under current leases approved by the lender. As a result, and as 
Defendants know, Plaintiff was unable to complete or file an 
application. This whole process would have been avoided if Ms. 
Bean had followed Mr. Clark's instruction to be sure to include 
language in the settlement agreement accounting for the possibility <ii 
that Plaintiff could not refinance the Phoenix Plaza Property. 
5. Exhibit 1 to Robinson's Response to Request for Admissions was the 
Affidavit of Melissa M. Bean, dated 6/13/11 (R. 688-692). Therein, Bean Q 
made the following statements under oath: 
2. We originally entered into mediation on November 2, 2007, in an 
attempt to craft a financial settlement to resolve the divorce action. Q 
The parties owned a number of real estate properties including a 
mall in St. George, Utah called the Phoenix Plaza. At that mediation, 
Petitioner [Robinson] relied upon financial information provided 
by Respondent [Ms. Robinson] as to the leases and the monthly G income stream into the Phoenix Plaza before he agreed to 
refinance it and buy Respondent out of the property. He relied on 
the information from Respondent because she has always 
negotiated rents on the property, the CAM fees and the leases for 
the tenants. G; 
3. Specifically, in agreeing to the stipulation, Petitioner relied upon a 
document prepared by Respondent and given to the parties CPA 
that the occupancy rate of the Phoenix Plaza was 95% and would 
be confirmed at the time that Petitioner would refinance the Gi) 
property. Petitioner also relied upon Respondent's 
representation that the Plaza would generate annual net income 
of $525,000 with a reasonable value for the Plaza of 
$7,000,000.00. Without those representations, Petitioner would 
GJ not have entered into the stipulation. 
4. The stipulation required that Respondent would manage the 
property until it was refinanced and she would provide regular 
monthly reports and year end reports. Q 
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Respondent was also ordered to provide regular bookkeeping and 
accounting for other properties, although she did not or did so 
untimely. 
After the stipulation, Respondent was required to provide certain 
financial information to Petitioner that would allow him to 
pursue the refinance of the Phoenix Plaza such as monthly 
accounting reports, including the year end 2007 reports. I 
repeatedly requested the information from Respondent's 
counsel, but it was not received until February of 2008-long 
after Petitioner needed the information in able to timely pursue 
the refinance of the Phoenix Plaza and three months after 
mediation. 
7. In addition, after the mediation Petitioner learned that the 
occupancy rate was far below what had been represented by 
Respondent and far below what he needed to be able to refinance 
the property. As confirmation, Petitioner received a letter from 
Columbian Life Insurance Company that his loan application 
required a ninety percent occupancy rate and the application would 
need to be returned by January 26, 2008; yet, the Phoenix Plaza did 
not have a ninety percent lease rate. 
8. Petitioner also learned that the net income was $75,000.00 less 
than what Respondent had [represented] and upon which 
Petitioner had relied at mediation. 
9. Respondent also was required to assist Petitioner with 
preparing and filing the loan application for the refinance and 
she did not do so. 
10. Once the fundamental flaws about the value and occupancy rate 
became clear and once Respondent failed to provide the 
necessary financial documents and insure the necessary leases 
to allow a refinance, I asked opposing counsel to return to 
mediation, pursuant to our stipulation, to try to resolve these issues, 
but they were unwilling to return to mediation 
11. ... 
12. We, therefore, moved the Court to set aside the stipulation 
because Respondent had provided inaccurate and material 
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information as to the occupancy of the Phoenix Plaza and failed 
to provide the financial information to allow Petitioner to 
pursue the refinance. Respondent's failure to provide the 
financial information was the first breach of the agreement1 
although certainly Petitioner's reliance on inaccurate 
information also made the refinance impossible because [ J 
according to his lender, the occupancy was so low as to make the 
property unstable in the eyes of a lender. 
13.1 believe that Respondent's actions in providing information that 
was not accurate as the value of the asset and its occupancy violated 
the standards of good faith and [fair] dealing and her failure to 
provide monthly and regular accounting constituted the first 
breach of the stipulation. Moreover, because the property did not 
have the requisite leases, Petitioner could not refinance it. 
14. This is the end of my affidavit. 
DATED this 13th day of June, 2011. 
/sf Melissa M. Bean 
[NOTARY BLOCK] 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 7 
Summary of Evidence Submitted by Robinson in 
Support of His Motion for Extension of Time to 
Respond to Summary Judgment Which Bore on 
Merits of Summary Judgment Motion. 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 7 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 7 
Summary of Evidence Submitted by Robinson in Support of His Motion 
for Extension of Time to Respond to Summary Judgment Which Bore on 
Merits of Summary Judgment Motion. 
1. From the Supplemental Affidavit of Michael S. Robinson Regarding 
Extension to Respond to Summary Judgment Motion. (R. 552-562). 
7. Attached are some emails between myself and former divorce counsel 
Defendants Stephen Clark and Melissa Bean, see Exhibits A and B. In 
Exhibit A Bean tells me: " ... Debra has performed, but it is too late and 
her tardiness makes the agreement impossible to effect and because 
she was the first to breach ( on the plaza, deer valley (sic), etc) (sic), you 
don't have to perform." This was the advice I had been given 
previously regarding my attempts to refinance some property., and 
this advice led directly to the disastrous consequences of the 
property division in my divorce. I wish to depose her about it. 
8. In Exhibit B, regarding the property division agreement, Clark tells 
Bean: "There probably ought to be some protections in the event he is 
unable notwithstanding his "best efforts" to refinance Phoenix Plaza." 
Further: "I notice there is a disclosure provision, but it's really not 
apposite or thorough. We did one in Dr. Segal's divorce ( also invovling 
(sic) Dean) that may be better ( e.g., in this one they say they have 
disclosure - it should probably say "in connection with entereing (sic) 
into this agreement the parties have fully disclosed all income, assets, 
liaibilities (sic), etc (sic) of any kind ... " Also, "(d)o your best to protect 
him against bad things that could happen down the road, like an 
unforeseen inability to refinance." Had this advice been followed by 
Bean I believe that my property division would have been vastly more 
fair, and I want to depose her regarding this email, and depose Clark to 
see ifhe feels his instructions were followed." Attached as Exhibits A & 
B to the Interrogatories were the cited emails. 
2. Attached as Exhibit B to Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Leave to File Sur Sur Response (R. 699-716) was another copy of the Bean 
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Affidavit (R. 708-712) ( which also was attached to the Lawyer Defendants' 
submission to the court (R. 688-92). 
3. Attached as Exhibit C to the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
for Leave to File Sur Sur Response (R. 699-716) was the Additional 
Supplemental Affidavit of Michael S. Robinson Regarding Extension to Respond 
to Summary Judgment Motion (R. 714-716). Therein, Robinson stated under 
oath as follows: 
2. When I went to mediation with my ex-wife (Debra) I 
had little knowledge of the value of the marital properties. Debra 
has a degree in accounting and an MBA, and had been paid to do 
the accounting for my properties for years. As my wife and paid 
accountant I had relied upon her for all financial matters and 
was not initially suspicious of her representations. Debra had 
provided our CPA with a document that overstated the income 
from the Phoenix Plaza. She represented a 5% vacancy and net 
of $525,000 per year before debt service. The tax return for that 
year later showed that she had overstated the income by 
approximately $75,000 per year. 
3. With perfect hindsight I would have arranged for 
independent valuations of the property, but Defendant Melissa 
Bean (Bean) never suggested such to me, and we went to 
mediation relying upon Debra's unsupported and fictitious 
numbers. During the mediation itself I made several calls to 
realtors to get an opinion on the value of the Phoenix Plaza, 
because Debra represented it having a much greater value than 
seemed appropriate to me. Bean was present while I made these 
calls and knew I was concerned about the proper value of the 
property, yet did not protect me against an improper valuation 
in the stipulation. 
4. Debra immediately refused to provide me with YTD 
[year-to-date] Income and Expense Report, which was necessary 
for any loan application to be complete. After Debra's refusal to 
provide the required documentation, within four days of the 
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mediation I called Bean to alert her to that problem and to 
matters which the mediation had totally failed to address. Bean 
told me within four days that Debra was in breach of the 
agreement for not providing the year-to-date (YTD) income and 
expense report I had requested as a prelude to refinancing the 
commercial property. 
5. The requirement from the mediated agreement was to 
apply for the refinance of the Phoenix Plaza within 15 days, and 
all lenders told me a YTD was required for a loan application. 
After assurances from Bean that Debra had committed the first 
breach, I was reluctant to spend approximately $43,000 to apply 
for a loan, and a further $40,000 payment at the time oflender 
commitment, all for an application I knew would be rejected out 
of hand without YTD information. At the mediation Debra had 
provided me with loan quotes from a broker and assured me 
that the refinance was available. In fact, the loan quotes had 
been provided to me by a broker, to whom Debra had given false 
information as to the Phoenix Plaza's percentage of leased space. 
I did not know the whole mediation proposal was based on 
misinformation provided by Debra. The Phoenix Plaza never 
qualified for the required loan. I relied on Debra's 
representations, and on Bean's commitment to protect my 
interests. 
6. After the application deadline had passed and Debra 
had not furnished the required YTD I believed that I was not 
obligated because of Bean's multiple statements to me 
concerning Debra's first breach. 
7. Later Bean told me that maybe I should try to get a loan 
although Debra continued to breach the agreement, and it was 
months before Debra provided the necessary report. 
8. Melissa confirmed her earlier directions in March when 
she verified in writing in an affidavit (See Exhibit B) what she 
had told me ... Debra was in breach and I was not required to 
perform. 
9. Later applications proved that tenant defaults and 
insufficient leased space percentages made any refinance 
impossible. The percentage of leased space was almost three 
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times greater than a lender would allow, and six times greater 
than the figures Debra provided to our CPA and which we relied 
on at the mediation. I hope to ask Bean in deposition why we did 
not have better information before signing the stipulation, and 
further why I was not protected in the event I was given false 
information by Debra or she otherwise failed to cooperate. 
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 8 
Chronological Presentation of Emails Presented 
by the Lawyers (R. 651-678) 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 8 
11/2/07 
ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 8 
Chronological Presentation of Emails Presented 
by the Lawyers (R. 651-678) 
Signing of Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement. 
11/17 /07 Putative date by which loan application was to be made 
[providing Ms. Robinson cooperated and provided necessary 
lease and financial information). 
NOTE: NO EMAILS FROM 11/2/07 THROUGH 11/17 /07 where Bean or 
Clark allegedly instructed Robinson to make loan application. 
11/26/07 10:52 a.m. Bean to Robinson: Michael, Have you received the 
information from Debra and/or me that you need to review 
the mall status? I have the final divorce documents and 
perhaps if we are in agreement on matters you could be 
divorced before the New Year. Let me know. M 
11/29/07 10:49 a.m. Robinson to Bean: Dear Melissa, I'm worried about 
the time limit on the refinancing. The interest on a possible 
mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza just adjusted to the tune of about 
$700 more per month. The government is saying that it will do 
whatever's necessary to help the struggling economy, so most 
analysts think that rates will drop in December and, again, in 
January. I need to get a rate that is reasonable, and may need 
more than the allowed time to secure good financing. I don't 
think I can live with the huge interest penalty to Debra, 
especially since I am paying the payments and expenses on her 
properties until she gets her cash. I didn't know the mortgage 
rates would be so unstable, and I am working on funding the 
buyout. I will talk to Debra and see if she'll be a little flexible on 
the penalty interest. 
Also you have not responded to my letter regarding Debra 
crediting me her share of the deposits and pre-paid rents. That is 
a sizeable obligation to me, as the owner of the Phoenix Plaza, 
and any seller would be required to credit those items to the 
Also you have not responded to my letter regarding Debra 
crediting me her share of the deposits and pre-paid rents. That is 
a sizeable obligation to me, as the owner of the Phoenix Plaza, 
and any seller would be required to credit those items to the 
buyer. The amount is substantial and will have to be determined 
through the leases. 
I do not want to finalize the divorce if these problems can't be 
resolved. What we're talking about is 20 years or more of my life, 
starting at age 60, when I cannot live the lifestyle I am 
accustomed to, and will be buried in debt, so even a thousand or 
two on my monthly loan payment will make a big difference. I 
will definitely need more time to secure and close a mortgage. I 
feel like an idiot, in this thing, because I allowed my own interest 
in settling and the encouragement of attorney and mediator to 
press me on a decision which is disadvantageous, somewhat 
unfair, and permanently damaging. Debra would never have 
allowed a firm value to be placed on the Demi Plaza in Sandy, 
based on the net rental income .... no, she forced me to agree to 
guarantee her a sale price on the property. I just feel stupid, but 
it's always been my nature to capitulate in order to have peace. 
Maybe its bad practice, but I really want to know if it would be 
possible to "drop" the divorce in order to get back to the 
bargaining table. Is it possible? Michael. 
10:53 a.m. Bean to Robinson: Michael, Please see if Debra will 
agree re; the time limit and whether she will simply agree on 
that matter of the deposits and pre-paid interest. If she will not 
agree and you want us to set aside the agreement we will need 
to begin working on that matter, but as I've stated setting the 
agreement aside is a 50-50 shot at best, so to the degree that you 
and Debra can make agreements, that will be better or we 
should see about a follow up mediation with Karin Hobbs. M 
1:57 p.m. Robinson to Bean: I have already approached Debra on 
the deposits and prepaid rent ... unanswered as yet. But I don't 
think that will be a problem. I am very concerned about the 
harsh delay penalties and do wish a reasonable extension. On a 
loan that big, timing is so important, and I can't just grab the first 
mortgage available, when it's about my life for the next 20 years. 
She shouldn't be unhappy about that, as it could have easily 
taken a year or two to dispose of all the properties for an 
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equitable split, had we done it the other way. I think I may need 
as much as six months from the agreement date to make the 
financing arrangement and cash her out, and that is very 
conservative. I don't mind paying an interest rate that reflects a 
realistic return ... which would a 7.00% a fairer deal. It shouldn't 
be a punitive rate, as long as I'm trying to finish the deal. Michael 
2:20 p.m. Bean to Robinson: Well, we need her agreement to 
modify. She [Ms. Robinson] said she would work with you on 
getting a good deal on the mortgage - are you two working on 
this? M. 
3:52 p.m. Robinson to Bean: We are working on it, but rates 
have been doing a bit of a roller coaster. If I can lock a rate 
slightly below the 6% mark, I will. Making progress, but I may 
still need an additional month or two, and I think that's 
reasonable. Michael. 
5:57 p.m. Bean to Robinson: Michael: I spoke with Dean tonight. 
He has just spoken to Debra and it appears that she is getting 
less willing to discuss ongoing modification. 
I did discuss the deposits and prepaid rents with Dean 
The deposits they do not as an issue for discussion - because if 
you pay out a deposit to a leaving tenant you will get a new one 
with the new tenant. 
It is the same with pre-paid security deposits-first and last 
months, etc. If someone moves out then you would get the same 
monies back from the new tenant. So as to the deposits and 
prepaid rents they don't see them as joint financial issues. They 
view them as items that you will deal with as the owner of the 
mall. We don't have anything in the agreement about it, so we 
don't have a position to force them to share those issues with 
you. 
As to the timeline for refinancing and the rates, there is a chance 
that Debra might be flexible, but my concern is that rates might 
just as well go up and then you would also be in a mess and want 
to totally redo the deal. I think if you can [get] a rate in the next 
week that is good, ou should lock it so we can get the documents 
in to the court before the end of the year. 
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Dean and Debra might (a very tenuous might) be willing to meet 
with Karin [Hobbs the mediator] for a 3 hour follow up session 
to tweak minor details, but they are willing [sic] to redo the deal. 
So to the degree that you can continue to work with your 
mortgage lender and other financial gurus to finalize details I 
think we should move towards finalizing everything, so you can 
have a fresh start in the new year. M 
11/30/07 9:22 a.m. Robinson to Bean: The deposit issue is a simple one. 
Since it is a real liability to us as the owners, and would have to 
be given as a real credit to any buyer, it needs to be credited as 
the "closing" with Debra. I would lower my net in a sale by at 
least $25,000 - $35,000. If Dean has any accounting experience, 
he would understand that this is a slam-dunk. There is no 
question that she owes it. I will call you. Michael. 
10:37 a.m. Robinson to Bean: Melissa, We have several 
fundamental problems with this agreement, and I want it 
stopped until we can have an additional mediation. I'm going to 
list the items, so you can identify the agreement paragraph that 
relates. 
Paragraph 39 
This is a big problem, because I will not have the benefit of the 
income from the Deer Valley Condo from which to pay my part 
of the taxes. She is apparently putting the money in a separate 
account, which is not fair to me. She can't have it both 
ways .... collecting all the money for herself-roughly $40,000 to 
$50,000-and then making me pay taxes on money I never saw 
or had any use of. At the same time she is sequestering the rents 
from Deer Valley in her personal account, I am forced to make 
the payments and pay for any expenses which she incurs on that 
property. How would Debra like it if she were given none of the 
income from the Phoenix Plaza during the interim period, but 
had to pay taxes on her share of the $50,000 plus per month that 
is coming in? It is patently unfair and needs to be resolved, 
either making half the collected income mine, or dismissing my 
expense, mortgage, and tax liabilities. My suggestion is that all 
income from all properties goes into a common account until 
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the Phoenix Plaza refinance is completed and Debra is paid 
off. 
Paragraph 41 
Virtually all the income is coming from the Phoenix Plaza, the 
Sandy Retail Center, and the Deer Valley Condo. Since I am 
paying all the mortgages and expenses on the other properties 
until I pay Debra her share of the Phoenix Plaza, it is consistent 
and fair to establish the "net income" which is to be shared 
under the current agreement, be reduced by any mortgages or 
expenses I am forced to pay on the properties granted to Debra. 
If there is any interest in a fair agreement, Debra and Dean 
should not have a problem with that. 
General 
The security deposits and last month's rent deposits are a 
significant amount of money. No title company, realtor, or 
banking institution would dismiss those as unimportant. Debra 
needs to give me credit for her half of those deposits at closing, 
because it is an obligation which should have been in a separate 
trust account and not spent. If I sell I need to give my buyer full 
credit for those trust items. Since Debra is seller her share to me, 
it is simply a matter of honest business to give a credit for the 
deposits which are hers. 
Debra and I have discussed the impending roof situation at the 
Phoenix Plaza, as we had multiple leaks over our best tenants' 
spaces during the monsoon season. Because we have around 
$62,000 in CAM fee adjustments coming to us during the next 
several months, I had suggested that we could use that money to 
apply a new roof. Our belief was that it would cost $30,000-
$40,000 for the roofing. We both agreed that it needed to be 
done immediately, and our conversation led me to believe that 
the back CAM fees could be used for that purpose, with her 
having the right to charge the tenants for her share of the 
expense. This is something she is reneging on. She is collecting 
the back CAM fees, and I haven't yet seen any share of them ... .l 
don't know exactly where she's keeping them, but she has 
indicated she's holding them and that they will be divided. Since 
the roofing issue is urgent, I need to have my share of the 
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delinquent CAM fees in order to start the roofing project, and I 
would like her to cover her side of the roofing costs, as any buyer 
would have insisted on a new roof, and any appraisal would 
have reflected that as a substantial deficiency. Debra does have 
the right to get her money back by billing the tenants at the end 
of the year, so it isn't going to hurt her. 
I am shopping rates on the Phoenix Plaza refinance. The rates 
are volatile, and it is expected that the interest rates will drop 
again in December or January. I may need S-6 months rather 
than the 120 days before interest begins. Since the interest 
rate controls my life for years hence, it [is] not a decision I can 
rush, especially with the [exorbitant] prepayment 
penalties ... which would be triggered by a subsequent 
refinance for a lower interest rate. I need the best rate 
available in the next couple of months. 
It is not fair that I pay 8% interest when I have to also pay all 
mortgages and expenses during that period. It is excessively · 
punitive and there should be no interest if I am actively pursuing 
my refinance and, at the same time, paying all Debra's expenses 
and allowing her ½ of any "net" income. 
These things need to be dealt with, and I suggest a couple of 
hours of mediation could take care of it. 
Thanks for your help in this matter. 
Michael 
10:40 a.m. Bean to Robinson: Thanks for your outline of issues. 
That is helpful for me. As to Paragraph 39-we can propose that 
everything go into a common pot. 
Paragraph 41-the same. 
As to Phoenix Plaza maybe we can go over the rents, etc. but 
from my impression yesterday I'm not sure how far they will 
budge. I'm pretty sure that we won't necessarily get 5-6 months 
for you to refinance. 
However, all that said, why don't we set up a half day mediation 
with Karin Hobbs asap so we can get everything resolved. I will 
let you know when we can get something scheduled. Thanks, M 
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12/5/07 3:37 p.m. Reese to Bean: Melissa, I talked with Dean Andreasen 
and he said he had talked with his client and she does not want 
to participate in mediation again. However, she is willing to talk 
with our client to get the final matters resolved. If you have any 
questions let me know. Thanks, Ashlee 
3:53 p.m. Bean to Robinson: Michael, My understanding 
yesterday was that Dean agreed, however, it appears that Debra 
will not agree. To that end, if you and Debra can make any 
concessions that is the most likely way that we can resolve 
things. Otherwise, they will likely pursue simply submitting the 
documents at the first of January. M. 
4:19 p.m. Andreasen to Bean: Melissa- I just told Ashlee in a 
telephone conversation that Debra does not want to participate 
in another mediation session but she said she would 
communicate with Michael directly to get everything 
resolved. Dean 
4:20 p.m. Bean to Andreasen: Also is the time then still ticking 
on the refinance or can we agree that when the parties reach 
their own internal resolution that will trigger the time? M 
4:46 p.m. Robinson to Bean: If the mediation and the document 
which was produced thereby are governed by "good faith", then 
the matter of the deposits and prepaid rents needs to be 
addressed. Omission of those items was simply an oversight and 
does not, in anyway, change Debra's obligation as the seller of 
her share to me. I assume the same on the Sandy retail center ... 
That she is entitled to have me pay half the deposits/prepaid 
rents on it. That is only fair. Everyone here, possibly including 
you, doesn't seem to think that taking another $25,000 or so 
from me makes any difference. There is no accountant, loan 
closing officer, or real estate agent that would not agree with my 
position on this. Nevertheless, I would let that go if Debra can 
show us the signed leases which substantiate her claim of 
$519,000 in net income after expenses. I've given into her on 
everything else, so since her figure was the source of the Plaza's 
selling price, it is only fair that the deal is not a deal if the figure 
wasn't correct. We need to see the real figures on gross and net 
rental income in order to finish this deal. Though the whole 
distribution is very unfair to me, in terms of the pre-marital 
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assets, I think I can live with everything else. So long as Debra 
proves enforceable rents that substantiate her income figures, I 
will proceed with finding financing and getting the deal done. 
Michael. P.S. I thought Debra was obligated to accept the 
clarifying mediation as well as her share of the expense. I'd like 
to proceed with that, if we can't get what we need to show that 
there was indeed good faith in the first mediation. 
4:4 7 p.m. Bean to Robinson: Why don't you go ahead and 
present that email to her and advise that if she will comply with 
your requests you will sign off on all the documents within ten 
days? That might be the carrot needed. M 
5:12 p.m. Andreasen to Bean: Paragraph 16.B. of the Stipulation 
provides that Michael has a window of 120 days "from the date 
the parties sign this Agreement" before the interest starts to 
accrue. Also, the loan application was to be filed "within 15 days 
of the date of this Agreement." I believe the clock is already 
ticking unless the parties modify the terms of the Stipulation. 
Dean 
5:13 p.m. Bean to Robinson: It appears that we need to get 
moving on this immediately then if that is how they are going 
to reframe the time. I will see if I can push Dean on this issue. 
Have you filed a loan application? M. 
7:19 p.m. Robinson to Bean: I am shopping rates and have 
several serious lenders. But the rates are fluctuating daily, and 
since I need to live with the payment for the next twenty or more 
years, I need to get the loan that suits me best. It is expected that 
the Feds are going to further lower the rates in the next week or 
two to stimulate the economy and help borrowers who are in 
trouble. My brokers are expecting a sub-6% loan. Thanks for 
asking. Michael. Also, a matter of importance. Debra must turn 
over rents on Deer Valley for the time which precedes the 
divorce decree. I cannot be expected to pay taxes on income I 
don't see. That is only fair. The way she originally presented it, 
was that the rent money covered rentals after the proposed 
divorce date. Since that isn't true and she about $7,000-$10,000 
in income for the Christmas and New Year weeks, please make 
sure that is shared and placed in the appropriate joint account. 
Thanks. Michael 
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12/7/07 7:27 p.m. Robinson to·Bean: Dear Melissa, I'm in trouble. I have 
two tenants, Ernesto's, Jr. and Shiloh Books, whose spaces are 
being flooded by rain, and I need Debra's help in getting the roof 
done properly. During the summer, she agreed, after multiple 
calls from tenants, that she was willing to use the back-CAM 
payments to help put on a new roof, as long as she was allowed 
to bill the tenants ... which is our right under the terms of the 
leases. I thought we had an agreement on it, but Debra, of course, 
denies it. She remembers saying it, as of a conversation tonight, 
but she says tonight, on the phone around 6:30 p.m., there was 
"no agreement,, or it would have been included in the mediation 
agreement. I pointed out to her that this was outside of the 
mediation, but I though[t] she'd never renege on it, as it really 
isn't any expense to her ... it's fully reimbursable. As always, she 
denied it over and over, and then said to someone in the room 
with her, "I know he's recording this." She is ruining my good 
will with the tenants by making them endure the water 
problems .... and I see no way to save the situation except by 
starting the roof work. I cannot do that, as I cannot afford it and 
still have enough to get the application started. 
Shiloh Brooks called today saying they had a serious leak and 
were losing merchandise. Dick Burrow said that he had talked to 
Debra, previously, about a small leak in the ceiling. I mentioned 
to Debra that Dick had said this, and she said he had never 
mentioned a leak. I told her, that [if] I'd known about the leak, 
the problem would have been taken care of. She was furious, and 
said she had never heard from the tenant that there was a 
leaking problem. Denial is her forte, which is why I did start to 
record her and keep copious notes of her antics during the last 
few years of the marriage. 
This problem threatens to ruin me, and I need immediate help, 
including Debra's cooperation and participation. She has gotten 
about 1.4 million more than she should have had, if marital and 
premarital holdings had been strictly adhered to. I think she can 
make good on her promise to help with the roofing, with her 
acknowledgement that she has the right to bill the tenants for 
her half of the improvements. 
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12/9/07 
She is getting top price for the Mall, but she is now saying that 
she never gave me the $519,000 net after expenses figure ... that 
all of her figures were monthly. You and her attorney, as well as 
the mediator were there. My exact words to her, in front of 
counsel and mediator were "You've told me that the net annual 
figure is $525,000. Is that correct or isn't it?" She answered, "It's 
more like $519,000, give or take a few dollars." I accepted that, 
in good faith and it was my basis for figuring an appropriate 
value for the Mall, along with my realtors advice that a 7% CAP 
[capitalization] rate could be used, but it wouldn't sell for more 
than a 7.25 CAP rate. That's where the settled-on sale price came 
from, but Debra has not been able to demonstrate that the Mall-
Phoenix Plaza - has ever brought in the figures she has 
represented. So, I'm paying top price for pie-in-the-sky. As far as 
I know it's an outright lie, at this point, and we need out of the 
agreement, since her figures, as the Plaza's accountant, were the 
basis for my decision. Since Debra is the accountant, and the net 
rental figures were hers, she now needs to prove that that 
amount of money, after expenses, is actually coming in. I haven't 
seen one month wherein the deposits, less expenses, supported 
her figure. Get me out of this. It was not a good faith agreement. 
The roof, as well, has to be included in the final agreement. If you 
believe that getting new counsel would buy me some time, I 
could do that, but I would ultimately wish to re-retain you for 
the duration. I need good advice fast, as I feel time and options 
are running out, and Debra's dishonesty is an ever-present 
problem. If good faith has anything to do with it, the present 
agreement must be set aside until these problems are resolved. 
Michael 
12:26 p.m. Bean to Robinson: Michael, Stephen and I reviewed 
your situation today and would advise: that you go ahead and 
get the roof fixed. Obviously, by your representation you need to 
have it repaired and it needs to be done quickly. It appears that 
you can use CAM funds or other funds to pay for the roof. We 
don't see any reason that we can require Debra to pay for the 
roofing expenses. If something goes wrong with the properties 
she receives, she likewise cannot come to you for monies to fix 
those problems. 
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We also don't see how paying for the roof will effect the costs 
of your loan application-are you somehow being required to 
pay some money to get submit your loan application? The 
stipulation does require that you both work together to get 
the Plaza refinanced-where are you on that? I'm reading 
that they will reduce rates again next week-our time at this 
point is running on your refinancing of the Plaza and I would 
advise you to move forward on doing so. 
Have you concluded from reviewing all the documentation to 
you that the amount was less than $519,000? Can we prove it 
with the proper documentation? I will go back to Dean on that 
issue, but need you to show with all the deposits what the 
amount is before we request an adjustment in the figure. 
We can only get this agreement set aside if we prove that Debra 
committed active fraud or concealment-part of the difficulty is 
that you had access to all the deposits and anything else that you 
wanted to review and you also had the same access to the CPA 
and your realtor for input. 
Please let me know fl we can prove with some definite evidence 
that Debra's numbers were off, and by how much, and then we 
can determine if we can revise the figures for the Plaza. Again, 
unless we can prove fraud or concealment, we don't have a 
strong basis for setting aside the deal otherwise and their 
position will be that you simply want a new deal. 
Thanks, M 
12/10/07 10:38 a.m. Robinson to Bean: Dear Melissa. You have not 
addressed the issues in my previous Emails. They are essential. 
1) I need to have Debra turn over my share of the income that 
she has collected from the Deer Valley Condo. Our agreement 
says that the income will be decided on whether the actual 
rental period is during the marital duration. I have Emailed 
you giving you approximate amounts of income which come 
from this Christmas and New Years holiday. Since that is 
during our marriage, that is not Debra's exclusive income. We 
have agreed that she can keep the rents which apply to 
periods after the finalization of the divorce. But any rents 
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earned before the divorce is final need to be put in the joint 
account and made available for both expenses and tax 
liabilities. Rents received for rentals during the expected 
duration of our marriage are approximately $10,000 to date. 
2) I need to have my half of the back CAM fees which Debra has 
been collecting. These would be helpful to me in getting work 
started on the roofing problems. Cash is also critical to 
being able to acquire refinancing for the Phoenix Plaza., as 
I will be required to pay 1-2% good faith., in order to lock a 
rate with a lender. 
3) I'm sorry, I've explained this before. I accepted Debra's 
estimate of $519,000 in net income before taxes for the 
Phoenix Plaza as the basis for determining its value. I'm sure 
that you and the mediator both remember me questioning 
Debra as to whether her previous net income figure of 
$525,000 was correct. She answered "it's more like $519,000 
give or take a few dollars." She now denies having said that, 
and insists that all figures she gave were monthly./ have not 
had access to all of the leases., as she took my documents., 
including my old business records., in February. I have not 
seen any of the documents since. She is also the only one 
who does the day-to-day accounting on the Plaza., and is 
the only who knows what the actual rents are. Since I have 
not seen the $640.,000+ in monthly deposits., that she 
represented as gross rents including CAMS., I have to 
believe her information was not correct. If she cannot 
demonstrate that income is actually being paid to us., I 
cannot abide by the agreement., and insist on further 
mediation. The agreement is not ... in good faith if she 
gave erroneous information on the Plaza's income. I just 
need her to show that the income is that high. Incidentally., 
the averages for the year., are thousands of dollars per 
month lower. This is not insignificant. If the difference is 
$3,000 per month in actual collections, then the Plaza's 
worth is lowered by $505,263.15. That is staggering 
difference, and, if you had to pay it, you would be standing 
up for your right to an honest figure from Debra. I believe 
the difference is greater than the $3,000 per month 
estimate., which was based on actual deposit information. 
This problem needs to be [taken] care of. 
12 
4) I don't know how much money is available to start work on 
the roof. I don't control the checkbook, and I don't know 
how much reserve is needed to cover all our typical monthly 
bills and our coming Holiday expenditures. I'd like to be able 
to write a check for $30,000 to get the job started, but I can't 
have our credit damaged by over-extending the account. 
Debra actually said a couple of months ago that she was 
willing to spend the incoming back-CAM fees on the roofing, 
as long as she could bill the tenants for her half, to which 
she's entitled. She has reneged on that, so I don't know where 
to go from here. The low cap rate we used in figuring the 
Phoenix Plaza's value doesn't allow for needed deferred 
maintenance-it is a premium price-and the roof is critical 
to keeping the tenants happy ... and, simply, keeping the 
tenants. 
Thanks for looking out for my interests. I wish that we had 
asked Debra to sign something guaranteeing her information 
was correct, but I somehow assumed that there was a record 
of the discussion which would allow me to go back if there 
was fraudulent information given by Debra. Let's go back to 
Karin for a few hours and see if we can get this right. 
Michael 
10:42 a.m. Bean to Robinson: Michael, I will write Dean and ask 
him about your questions, but as to the net income for the Plaza, 
we need to demonstrate why that figure is off. Do you not have 
all the documents at this time? I can still ask her to clarify. As 
you may recall, Dean indicated that Debra is not willing to 
re mediate, but I'll reg uest they consider it based on your 
questions below. M 
12:09 p.m. Robinson to Bean: Hi, Melissa. I just had a very gentle 
conversation with Debra, in which back-CAM collections, Deer 
Valley income, and Phoenix Plaza issues were discussed. She 
sounds like she'll come through on most of it, but I am very 
worried about losing an opportunity to contest the rent figures 
and the resultant Phoenix Plaza sale price. She says she's found 
that there are several tenants who were paying the wrong 
amounts and says that accounts for deposits being short. She is 
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assuring me that will be taken care of, but I think the figure may 
still be wrong by thousands of dollars. Can we buy some time in 
which to document correct lease amounts and establish a short 
history of corresponding monthly deposits? She has been 
working on negotiating new rents for several tenants, and I 
will need signed leases and addendums in order to refinance 
the Plaza. Even though we "agreed" on a price, with now-
questionable information, maybe it would be possible to get an 
impartial professional appraisal to verify that it isn't completely 
out of the ball park. That should create a sense of objectivity and 
fairness for both parties. Thanks. Michael 
1:12 p.m. Bean to Robinson: I will ask Dean ifwe can buy some 
time, however, as of now, he is planning to submit the 
documents at the beginning of January. If you and Debra can 
agree to an extension, say until January 31st, then we can execute 
an amendment to the stipulation as to the time-extension. 
Based on your conversation then, I will wait to see if you two can 
agree on those issues rather than following up with Dean 
formally. 
Please let me know if Debra will agree to an extension. M 
8:04 p.m. Robinson to Bean: Dear Melissa. We do have a fraud on 
our hands, and I refuse to be robbed of another half-million 
based on Debra's misrepresentation. It seems I have to make the 
language a little stronger in each email, so that it has a more 
powerful impact. Though Debra was cooperative today on 
matters of Deer Valley income and distribution of collected back-
CAM payments, the matter of the incorrect representations by 
my "accountant" of the Phoenix Plaza still needs to be corrected. 
I use the word 11accountant" because Debra is the only one 
who had the information necessary to give us a current net 
income figure during the mediation. In a sense, it gives her two 
types of status, one as the respondent in the divorce case, and 
the other as a trained professional who understands the 
significance of incorrect income information. One of two things 
needs to happen: a) Verification of Debra's representation of 
net income after expenses needs to be substantiated by 
properly executed leases and lease addendums. That will 
satisfy me, though I'm very unhappy we've had no months in 
which bank account deposits showed the amounts which would 
yield such a net amount ... orb) A professional, unbiased, 
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objective appraisal that gives us a figure of at least $7M. (I don't 
require the $7.25M price to be verified, as the $250,000 was 
added--$125,000 to Debra's credit and the same to mine-for 
her participation in refinancing costs and prepayment 
penalties.) You said fraud is a cause to suspend the agreement, 
and it needs to be suspended until one of these courses of action 
is completed. Please discuss this with Stephen and come up with 
a plan. Thank you. Michael 
8:43 p.m. Bean to Robinson: Michael, The problem is not your 
language, but that you had previously stated that you and Debra 
were having discussions on these issues and making some 
headway and in addition, I had responded yesterday with the 
requirement that we prove that the $519,000 was not proper-
this response was crafted after conferencing with Stephen Clark. 
Tonight there is another series of emails, so I am going to be very 
concrete with my response. 
To be very clear: I will draft a letter to Dean requesting a 
full/accurate disclosure and proof for the monthly income on 
the mall and will ask to have Debra demonstrate how she 
arrived at the $519,000. To clarify- do you not have 
statements to review to show that amount? I will also ask 
that we suspend the timeline on requirement to refinance the 
mall, however, I would encourage you to continue to use your 
best efforts to refinance. 
It is my understanding that we forwarded to you the documents 
that we received from Debra including the leases. Have you not 
received any leases? Do you not have access to them on your 
computer? That is what Debra stated previously. I will review 
what Dean/Debra sent to us and send them to you again for your 
review. 
I do not know whether we can get or force the other side to 
agree to an appraisal of the mall to now re-calculate the value of 
the mall, since that was a value that you and Debra had 
negotiated both prior to the actual mediation and then during 
the mediation. That said, if we can prove that the amount of 
rents is incorrect, then we may be able to renegotiate value. 
If Dean and Debra will not provide the accounting or otherwise 
agrre to allow you the time to verify the amount, we will likely 
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need to move forward and file a motion to set aside the 
settlement agreement. If the motion to set aside is granted, then 
we would need to renew discovery, perhaps involving a forensic 
accounting, and proceed through litigation or renewed 
settlement negotiations. 
I will draft the letter to Dean this evening and get it faxed in the 
morning. 
Melissa 
12/11/07 8:11 a.m. Robinson to Bean: For some reason, the rent roll is 
something I cannot open on either of my computers. Also, 
having some of the leases in my computer doesn't verify what 
tenants are now paying, since there have been adjustments 
over the last few years. Debra is renegotiating some of the 
leases which have expired, and those will have to be signed 
before any lending institution will touch the refinance. There 
are also some leases which existed when we bought the Plaza, 
and I do not have any information on them. Debra said 
during our last conference call that she didn't know if she had 
the leases, and that she thought I had them. That was a real 
lapse of memory for her, as she took them in February and 
has never returned them. 
3/17/08 
Another problem has arisen which is downright scary ... Split 
Rock, our biggest tenant with around 20% of the leasable space, 
[is] not sure they will be renewing their leases. That alone could 
destroy me, considering the amount of debt I'm taking on. I 
allowed Debra to assume a minimal vacancy rate in the 
negotiations, never dreaming that I could have several vacancies 
within months of the refinance. Just the realty commissions to 
re-rent their spaces would be around $14,000-in a year 
wherein my income might not cover the roof, taxes, and some 
basic living expenses. 
Could you send the lease information in another form ... or paste 
into the Email, so I can see it. Thanks. 
2:11 p.m. Robinson to Bean: Hi, Melissa, I have asked my broker 
repeatedly for the letter, stating that the Phoenix Plaza's 
current rental/leasing report shows a percentage of leased 
spaces far under the criteria set by the lender for refinance. 
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He has proved unwilling to put anything in writing, saying that 
the Columbian [insurance company for which Robinson had 
an application] speaks for itself. It showed that, in order to do 
a refinance, 90% of the property had to be under current 
leases. I have sent you the percentages. They don't come close, 
even if we believe that the two spaces Debra lied about in the 
February report are really leased-which they are not. The 
broker also told me that Columbian's new offer has expired, 
and that, when we figure out how much of a loan I'll need, he'll 
be happy to go back to the company for a new quote. 
These are essential facts and we don't need a letter from a 
broker to say it: 
1) The current leased space is below the lender's 
requirement 
2) Debra lied about what spaces are actually covered by 
leases. Las Palmeras Restaurant and Red Rock Cleaners 
are not covered by leases, though Debra shows lease 
expirations in 2010 on both of those. 
I am still hoping that Steve Clifford, the broker, will send a short 
letter to that effect. Yet, the Columbian requirements letter and 
the numbers supplied by Debra speak for themselves. What are 
we doing about it? 
Thanks, 
Michael 
2:26 p.m. Bean to Robinson: I'm pulling the most current Utah 
cases on impossibility and first to breach so we can refocus 
our prior pleading to now state-now Debra has performed, 
but it is too late and her tardiness makes the agreement 
impossible to effect and because she was the first to breach 
(on the plaza, deer valley, etc.) you don't have to perform. 
Stephen and I conferenced on that on Thursday and will be 
renoticing up our new /revised motion and require Dean to 
respond and then we will need to argue it. Of course, it is far 
more effective to have documentation to support our argument 
re: impossibility which is why further support from the lender 
would be very helpful. M 
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10/10/08 3:56 p.m. Clark to Robinson: Michael, I got your voicemail 
further confirming our prior judgment that it will be difficult to 
prove fraud in connection with the stipulation. 
I do not see so far that the fraud angle is going to be terribly 
fruitful, but to the extent you can ferret out misrepresentations 
or omissions we can consider raising them in a Rule 60 motion 
for relief from the judgment, as we discussed. 
I think it would be more helpful to focus on a couple of other 
things. 
First, if you want to go through Debra's affidavit and provide a 
detailed response, I can use that in the context of objecting to 
Commissioner Evan's recommendation and asking for an 
evidentiary hearing with Judge Iwasaki as the next step in 
seeking to block the Decree from being entered. If Judge Iwasaki 
essentially rubber-stamps the recommendation and enters the 
Decree, we can file post-judgment motions, including a request 
under Rule 52 to amend the findings and/or a request under 
Rule 59 for an amendment of the judgment. Those rules allow 
relief from a judgment or decree based on such things as "newly 
discovered evidence," which strikes me as a good possibility 
here if we show the changed circumstances by way of affidavits 
from you and Gottschall or some other financial guru showing 
whatever the case was as of November 2, 2008, newly 
discovered evidence as to the facts existing then do not support 
the Decree. If all that fails and we have to appeal we will have to 
consider a stay on the Decree pending appeal and pursuing an 
appeal. 
We have 10 days after the entry of the Decree to file a motion 
under Rule 52 or Rule 59, so we need to start lining this stuff up 
pronto. I will try to focus in the next few days on what kinds of 
specific additional info we might need to provide and outline 
that and then rely on you to coordinate gathering it. 
I hope in the midst of this you can relax on the weekend and we 
will hit this again next week. 
Stephen 
9:42 p.m. Robinson to Clark: Thank you, Stephen. I will get to 
work on my end .... and hopefully I'll get some good sleep, which 
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has been very difficult. You have mentioned that agreements 
entered into because of coercion can be undone. I do think 
Debra's constant threatening that, if I didn't sign the agreement 
taking the Phoenix Plaza, she would go for 50% of everything. 
That scared me, because she told me that three attorneys had 
told her should could get half, even though I had owned 
considerable pre-marital assets. 
That was looking like the ultimate unfairness, so I was 
capitulating to her coercive tactics. I hate debt and had lived my 
life being very careful about carrying debt. She knew how much I 
dreaded debt, because I had always resisted borrowing as a 
means to acquiring more property. I had thirty-five apartments 
debt free-except for about $170,000-when I married her, and 
I was uncomfortable borrowing, especially as I got older and was 
more concerned about security than getting richer. I would have 
never considered the deal we struck had it not been for her 
constant threats about getting "half of everything." Actually, I 
told Melissa that Debra threatened to go for 50% if I didn't go 
along with her settlement proposal, asking her if that was a 
likely scenario. She indicated that was a very possible, if not 
probable, outcome. In retrospect my fear put me into a much 
worse situation. Let me know if the "coercion" angle is likely to 
have any value in getting the settlement agreement set aside. 
Michael 
10/11/08 3:54 p.m. Clark to Robinson: Michael, this is not "coercion" in the 
eyes of the law, and will never suffice to have the agreement set 
aside. 
In terms of your options, I recall we did a memo for you 
outlining the approaches courts take in these matters. We stand 
by that analysis. I also recall that by the time we got to 
mediation, you and Debra had essentially had the deal worked 
out, and you were bargaining solely over the value of the Plaza. 
The mediation was preceded by several months of your 
strenuous efforts to work something out so you would not have 
to endure a drawn-out and expensive litigation process. So while 
I can certainly understand and appreciate the concerns you 
express herein, they are not new, and they didn't arise as a result 
of anything other than choices you made. 
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May I suggest that, in addition to the possible approaches I 
outlined yesterday, you do one more thing, and that is get an 
application for the refinancing of the Plaza on file and pursue it 
as vigorously as you can? 
If the value has fallen, if the leaseholds are not sufficient, if all the 
other terms and conditions cannot be satisfied, then that will be 
evidenced by the failure of the actual process, rather than just 
expressions of doubt or concern or fear or hesitation. I know you 
would prefer that the entire deal be undone and you get your 
1031 share, but I can only repeat that is very unlikely to happen, 
so you would be well advised to being planning for the 
possibility that this deal will be reduced to a court order and you 
will be required to comply at risk of being found in contempt of 
court, and unless we can demonstrate that you are unable to 
comply we will have limited defenses. So that will require 
concrete proof that (1) there is no way for you to pay the $1.78 
million ( or the alternative interest payments) without a 
refinancing, and (2) there is no way for you to refinance and 
secure that amount of money to pay Debra. In my view, the best 
way to do the latter is actually shop loans, put in the application 
and go through the process. 
10 /11/08 6:00 p.m. Robinson to Clark: Stephen, My mind has gone blank. 
In our phone conversation you told me something( s) that I 
needed to do right away to assist in my case. I never dreamed I 
could forget, but now I have no idea what it was. Could you 
refresh my memory so I can start working on it? Thanks. Michael 
11/7 /08 8:12 a.m. Robinson to Steve Clifford [mortgage broker]: Dear 
Steve, The matter of refinancing the Phoenix Plaza is pressing. 
I'm providing you with an updated rent roll and personal 
financial statement. Please let me know if there1s anyone who 
would do the deal with reasonable terms. 
Thank you. 
Michael Robinson 
11:37 a.m. Robinson to Clark: Dear Stephen, I sent an email to 
my mortgage broker, relative to the $3.SM refinance, including 
the present lease information and an updated financial 
statement. He sent the following answer. 
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Michael 
--- Begin forwarded message: 
From: "Steve Clifford" SClifford@Northmarq.com 
To: broncojockey@digis.net 
Subject: RE: $3.SM refinance 
Date: Fri, 7 Nov 2008 11:12:16 -600 
Michael-this would have to be a recourse loan and it 
appears that you have little in the way ofliquid assets. I 
think it would be difficult to find financing in today's 
environment. 
Steve Clifford 
11:44 a.m. Clark to Robinson: Is there way to do an application 
and have it turned down? Or get something more concrete and 
admissible? 
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